Zirzow and Larson Las Vegas Attorneys for Pedophile Rights Porn lawyer, White Supremacy Rights Lawyer Marc Randazza Randazza Legal Group. Marc Randazza attorney for Dennis Hof Las Vegas Virgin Auctions.

Pedophile Rights Porn lawyer, White Supremacy Rights Lawyers of Randazza Legal Group. Supported by Las Vegas Attorney Matt Zirzow, Zacharia Larson and Shara Larson.

Virgin auction promoter & PIMP Dennis Hof hires pedophile rights porn lawyer of Randazza Legal Group. Nevada Brothel Owner Dennis Hof.

Marc Randazza, Randazza Legal Group.

#StopHof  #RandazzaLegalGroup #MattZirzow #FirstAmendment #RandazzaQuotes #ZachariaLarson

Adam "STEINBAUGH AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MCGIBNEY GANG IDENTIFIED"

Hypocritcal Attorney Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group seems to be a but Slippery Under Oath or perhaps has even purjured himself yet again. Marc Randazza Bankruptcy filing as he relentless attacks blogger Crystal Cox, sure seems to be perjury to me.

Marc Randazza Bankruptcy

In Marc Randazza’s Recent Filing, Motion for Default, Case 16-01111-abl Doc 26 Entered 10/20/17, he claims that ONLY upon Volokh being interested in teaming up with him was he then “willing to accept the case”. Meaning the Crystal Cox Ninth Circuit Appeal. Yet Crystal Cox claims Randazza represented her before this and told others he was her attorney. Randazza states in earlies sworn documents a different version of his story, let’s take a look.

Page 38, Line 26-28 and Page 39 1-4, Case 16-01111-abl Doc 26, (Randazza Decl. ¶ 26) Says: “Only upon Mr. Volokh expressing an interest in teaming up on the case with him did Mr. Randazza decide that he was willing to accept the case. (Randazza Decl. ¶ 26).”

In this sworn statement (Randazza Decl. ¶ 26) Randazza claims he was only interested in representing me, Crystal Cox, with Volokh and only offered to represent me after this conversation. Even though, the only reason Volokh was talking to Randazza about me, Crystal Cox was Randazza told Volokh he represented Crystal Cox. And that he was brokering a deal with the Opposition in the Obsidian case, David Aman.

The statement is false, and it is making a false declaration to a Federal Court while knowing full well it is False as Randazza swore to different facts in Case 2:12-cv-02040-JAD-PAL Document 252 Filed 04/06/15,  Exhibit 9, Marc Randazza’s sworn interrogatory answers.

So in Case 16-01111-abl Doc 26, Page 38, Line 26-28 and Page 39 1-4, we see RANDAZZA swearing that he ONLY agreed to Represent Cox after Volokh expressed interest to team up with him.   We see below in a previous Sworn statement of Randazza that he was involved in representation BEFORE speaking with Volokh, talking strategy with Volokh, and only spoke with Volokh after he had already put in time and material into representation.

Click Here for Exhibit clearly showing Volokh working with Randazza. Why would Volokh do that if Randazza did not flat out tell Volokh that he, Marc Randazza represented Cox.

Click the Exhibit below for eMail from Volokh to Cox whereby Volokh says Marc told him that he was representing me, Crystal Cox. Randazza Continues to state that he was not my attorney nor acting as my attorney when the evidence paints a very different truth.

Interrogatory 21 Exhibit 9:

“Did you have phone conversations with Eugene Volokh and state that you represented Cox and discuss with him your strategy, or a deal you were trying to make with the opposition, Plaintiff’s attorney David Aman?”

Randazza’s Sworn RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

"... Counterdefendant responds as follows:

Counterdefendant spoke with Eugene Volokh in December 2011.

Counterdefendant informed Volokh that if he was going to represent Cox, that Randazza would gladly bow out, and defer to Volokh to handle the case.

Volokh, however, said that he would prefer that Randazza co-counsel the case with him due to Volokh’s stated lack of litigation experience. Counterdefendant and Volokh discussed possible strategies that he and Volokh thought might be good ideas during that call.

Counterdefendant and Volokh both discussed the fact that Cox’s interests would be better served through settlement."

What gave Marc Randazza a legal right to negotiate who gets to be my attorney with him, if he was not indeed my attorney, or acting as if he was my attorney?

Randazza and Volokh discussed strategy? About Me? They discussed that a settlement was in my, Crystal Cox’s, best interest?

A couple of guys deciding what was in my best interest and Randazza proceeding with steps to negotiate what was in my best interest when Randazza clearly and plainly knew that I want to appeal. I did NOT want to settle nor did I want some aggressive, asshole man to decide it would be better if I settled and push me to do what I did want to do, negotiate behind my back, and trick and deceive me by letting the deadline run out while he held himself out as my attorney so no one else would represent me, thereby blocking me from appealing. He did not know I had talked to Volokh when he tried to pull off this malicious scheme.

In Conclusion,

Page 38, Number 1-13 of Interrogatory 21 Exhibit 9, Case 2:12-cv-02040-JAD-PAL Document 252 Filed 04/06/15 is Marc J. Randazza’s SWORN statement that the Interrogatory Answers are true to the best of his knowledge, yet we see on Page 38, Line 26-28 and Page 39 1-4, Case 16-01111-abl Doc 26, (Randazza Decl. ¶ 26) that Marc Randazza swears to the a VERY different Answer.

See Case 16-01111-abl Doc 28 Entered 10/20/17, DECLARATION OF MARC J. RANDAZZA IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT ENTERED BY THE COURT Page 16, Line 23-25 says:

“I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated: October 20, 2017.
/s/ Marc J. Randazza
MARC J. RANDAZZA, ESQ.”

So How Can Both be True under penalty of perjury?

#MarcRandazzaBankruptcy #MarcRandazza #RandazzaQuotes #RandazzaLegalGroup Marc Randazza Bankruptcy

First Amendment Attorney Marc J. Randazza SUES blogger Crystal L. Cox to Suppress her Speech. 5 years later wants her to pay his legal fees for his Unconstitutional Retaliatory Law Suit against her. $350,000 to SUE a Blogger over a $10 Domain Name that Trademark Attorney, Domain Name, First Amendment Expert Marc Randazza was to damn dumb to buy. WOW. Check out these BILLS folks. All to suppress the speech of someone speaking critical of big baby Marc Randazza.

Retaliatory RIPOFF RAT Ronald Green sure does charge his partner, partners wife and child a WHOLE lot of money for RETALIATION against a Whistleblower exposing him and speaking critical of him.  WOW 262k and counting to TRY and take away my First Amendment Rights. What a Bunch of EVIL Dirty Jackasses.

CHECK OUT THIS 262,000 BILL. wow.. HATE TO SEE WHAT HE CHARGES ATTORNEYS THAT ARE NOT HIS PARTNER OR BOSS...
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bzn2NurXrSkiUlh4MlpYdjAxOVk/view?usp=sharing

And Check out this 111,000 bill .. WOW. Sure cost alot to SUE a blogger for calling you names.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bzn2NurXrSkiMGdRSGRPZVMzLVE/view?usp=sharing

Also Check Out

http://UnethicalScumattorney.blogspot.com/

Marc Randazza

Porn News Today, Monica Foster Reporting; Randazza – the porn attorney associated with the Free Speech Coalition, Xbiz & a pedophile – just filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Stephen E. Haberfield Arbitrator; Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group FINALLY gets EXPOSED for who he REALLY Is. Now will the Authorities STOP him from creating so many victims ? Check Out the Document Below.

"THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR --- in accordance with the
arbitration provision in Section 8 of the Contract For Employment Agreement As
General Counsel Between Marc J. Randazza and Excelsior Media Corp., dated
June 6/10,2009 ( consideration of the evidence, the parties' written submissions and applicable
law, and good cause appearing--- make the following findings, conclusions,
determinations ("determinations") and this Interim Arbitration Award, as
follows:


(employment agreement ), and based upon careful

DETERMINATIONS


1. The determinations in this Interim Arbitration Award include
factual determinations by the Arbitrator, which the Arbitrator has determined to
be true and necessary to this award. To the extent that the Arbitrator's
determinations differ from any party's positions, that is the result of
determinations as to relevance, burden of proof considerations, and the weighing
of the evidence.


2. The Arbitrator has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties to the arbitration which are as follows: Claimant and Counter-
Respondent Marc J. Randazza ("Mr. Randazza"), Respondents and
Counterclaimants Excelsior Media Corp. ("Excelsior"), Liberty Media Holdings,
LLC ("Liberty''), and Respondent Jason Gibson.


3. On February 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, 2015, the Arbitrator held in-person
evidentiary sessions on the merits of the parties' respective claims, counterclaims
and contentions. All witnesses who testified did so under oath and subject to
cross-examination. All offered exhibits were received in evidence.

4. This Interim Arbitration Award is timely rendered. See Order of June 1, 2015.

5. The following is a summary of the Arbitrator's principal merits
determinations:


Except as otherwise stated or indicated by context, "E/L" shall be used to reference
Excelsior and Liberty, collectively and interchangeably for convenience in this Interim
Arbitration Award, only. Nothing should be inferred or implied that there is any
determination, or basis for any determination, that either or both of those entities are
"alter egos" of Jason Gibson or of any person or entity. Mr. Randazza failed to sustain
his burden of proof that either Excelsior or Liberty were or are "alter egos" of
Respondent Jason Gideon or of any person or entity. Mr. Gideon will be dismissed as a
party in this arbitration. See Interim Arbitration Award, Par. 9, at p. 29, infra .


2.

A. Mr. Randazza voluntarily ended his employment by Excelsior and Liberty.

B. Mr. Randazza's employment by Excelsior and Liberty was not involuntarily terminated by Excelsior, Liberty or at alP

C.   Whether or not Mr. Randazza's employment by E/L was terminated voluntarily by Mr. Randazza or involuntarily by E/L, the principal proximate cause for the ending of Mr. Randazza's employment was Mr. Randazza's breaches of fiduciary duty and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied in his employment agreement, as an employee, executive and general counsel of E/L.

The precipitating events which led to the end of Mr. Randazza's employment was Mr. Gideon's having first learned on August 13, 2012 that Mr. Randazza had been involved in and successfully concluded negotiations for a bribe in the amount of $75,000, to be paid to Mr. Randazza by the other side in connection with resolution of high-importance litigation, commonly referred to as the "Oron litigation," which had been initiated and pursued on behalf of E/L by Mr. Randazza, as E/L's counsel of record.

The first indication of that was Mr. Gideon's noticing a provision included in an
execution copy of an Oron settlement agreement, presented to him for signature by Mr. Randazza on that date, and Mr. Gideon's inquiring of Mr. Randazza about that provision.

After initial contacts with Mr. Randazza concerning what Mr. Gideon discovered in the Oron settlement agreement, communications and relations between Messrs. Gideon and Randazza noticeably chilled during Mr. Randazza's remaining employment, which ended on August 29,2012.

2.  While not accepting Mr. Randazza's "core contentions" concerning the end of his employment by E/L, the Arbitrator agrees with Mr. Randazza's assertion that "The nature of Mr. Randazza's departure from Excelsior is cenh·al to several of his causes of action, and crucial to the defenses Respondents raise" --- including whether there was a breach of contract, wrongful termination, constructive termination and/ or retaliatory termination. Reply at p. 7:12-15. As also stated elsewhere herein, none of those claims were proven.

3.    The chilled relations, including greatly reduced communication, was in stark contrast with the custom and practice of Messrs.

Gibson and Randazza, practically right up to August 13, 2012, being in regular, frequent, cordial and occasionally sexually-peppered communication with each other by face-to-face meetings, texting and emails.

That Mr. Gideon's reaction was not feigned or a pretext for anything asserted by Mr. Randazza in his competing narrative are shown by the following:

1.   A sudden and significant reduction of those previously primarily electronic (i.e., email and text) communications --- beginning only after Mr. Gideon learned of the $75,000 bribe--- with Mr. Randazza sending Mr. Gideon unresponded-to emails attempting to attempting to salvage and revive his communications and relationship with Mr. Gideon.

2.   Mr. Randazza beat a hasty retreat, in an attempt to salvage the situation by offering to pay the bribe money over to E/L, when initially confronted by Mr. Gideon concerning the bribe provision in the Oron settlement agreement, presented for Mr. Gideon's signature.

3. Mr. Gideon did not timely sign the execution copy of the Oron settlement agreement, as negotiated and presented to him by Mr. Randazza.

D. The ending of Mr. Randazza's employment E/L was not --- as contended by Mr. Randazza --- (1) constructive discharge, proximately caused by Mr. Gibson becoming distant and out-of-communication with Mr. Randazza, which made it difficult or impossible for Mr. Randazza to get needed instructions or direction in his employment byE/Las their general counsel, leading to Mr. Randazza's employment, or (2) retaliatory termination, which was caused by Mr. Randazza
having expressed his feelings of having been upset, betrayed, offended, and  August 29, 2012 email of resignation from stressed" anything of a sexual nature whatsoever--- including, as highlighted
during hearing, a pornographic video shot in Mr. Randazza's office in April, 2012 or a homosexual oral copulation allegedly performed by Mr. Gideon and another ElL executive in the backseat of Mr. Randazza's car, which allegedly greatly upset Mr. Randazza while he was driving his passengers back from a party aboard Mr. Gideon's boat on August 9, 2012.

E. The immediately foregoing Determination's repeated use of the word "allegedly" is because it is not necessary to resolve a conflict of evidence as to whether the alleged sexual act in Mr. Randazza's car actually occurred or the degree of upset it caused Mr. Randazza, if it actually occurred. That is because the Arbitrator has determined that--- contrary to Mr. Randazza's central contentions in this arbitration--- the factual and legal cause of the end of Mr. Randazza's employment had nothing whatsoever to do with anything having to do with alleged sexual activity in Mr. Randazza's car--- alone or taken together with a pornographic shoot which, without dispute, occurred in his office,
without prior notice to Mr. Randazza, but which the evidence shows did not occur as alleged, was not strongly or even negatively reacted to by Mr. Randazza as initially alleged and did not, as shot or shown, include a photograph of Mr. Randazza's family, as initially presented by Mr. Randazza.

The foregoing determination includes that anything relating to sex ---including in connection with a filmed video in Mr. Randazza's ElL office or in the back seat of his car--- had nothing whatsoever to do with any decision --- which the Arbitrator has determined was neither made or considered --- to terminate Mr. Randazza's ElL employment. 2012.

There was no ElL contrived pretext or any retaliation by ElL in connection with the cessation of Mr. Randazza's ElL employment, which was entirely voluntary on Mr. Randazza's part.

For those reasons, the Arbitrator has determined that Mr. Randazza failed to sustain his burden of proof required to establish his claims of and relating to anything having to do with sex --- e.g., sexual harassment, hostile work environment, constructive termination, retaliatory termination, etc.

F. As stated above --- and as picked up and amplified later in the Determinations portion of this Award--- since the outset of the arbitration, Mr. Randazza made highly-charged, sexually-based "core allegations" and his claimed strong reactions to them in support of his statutory and contractual claims, which were in the main disproved or not proved. That failure of proof undermined and impaired Mr. Randazza's credibility concerning all of his testimony and his claims and related contentions.

The evidence established at hearing was that Mr. Randazza intended that his allegations would induce Mr. Gideon to authorize a settlement financially favorable to Mr. Randazza, based on Mr. Randazza's belief at the time--- and ultimately proven incorrect--- that Mr. Gideon would so settle, rather than have to litigate true or false allegations relating to his own sexuality, sexual activity, and the pornographic nature of E/L's business.

Mr. Randazza's miscalculation, as aforesaid, led to an ultimately successful counterattack by E/L, via counterclaims in this arbitration, centering on ethical and legal challenges to Mr. Randazza general counsel and litigation counsel during his employment by E/L.

Mr. Randazza negotiations with adverse parties, including concerning monetary bribes to conflict (Mr. Randazza) out from future litigation, further damaging E/L recovery in the Oron litigation by knowingly forwarding illegally computer data to counsel for another company, without authorization and in contravention of an E/L settlement agreement, engaging in other prohibited conflicts of interest, including representing competitors of E/L, not disclosing and not obtaining informed written client consents from E/L where actual or potential conflicts of interest arose, working and not disclosing that he was working as a practicing lawyer on non-E/L matters during his employment significantly in excess of what was contractually permitted, spoliation of evidence to cover up the foregoing and his undisclosed intention to resign from  employment, including via planning and causing the deletion of legal files and other relevant data from E/L-owned computers, taking control of client funds, in form of Oron litigation settlement proceeds, and refusing to unconditionally release the same to E/L.

G. As stated above, Mr. Randazza voluntarily ended his employment by E/L. The principal evidence of that consisted of (1) Mr. Randazza 2012 email to Mr. Gideon, (2) days before sending Mr. Gideon his August 29 email, Mr. Randazza cleaned out his personal belongings from his office, (3)
shortly after Noon on August 28--- and more than 24 hours before sending his August 29 email to Mr. Gideon--- Mr. Randazza had his corporate laptop computer Wiped the first of four times during his last week of employment, and (4) before that, Mr. Randazza was overheard to say Fuck this shit, I quit/ following a company happy hour event.


H.   In his August 29,2012 email to Mr. Gideon, Mr. Randazza stated
that he could no longer represent the Company, i.e., E/L. s In the circumstances
then known, Mr. Gideon and other E/L executives with whom he consulted
reasonably, and not hastily, concluded from their review of Mr. Randazza's
August 29, 2012 email that Mr. Randazza had resigned from his employment.

Their conclusion was proven accurate by facts which became known after Mr.
Randazza's departure. Any actions taken by them based on that reasonable
belief did not result in any involuntary termination of Mr. Randazza's E/L
employment.

I.    The lack of absolute, unquestionable, pristine clarity in Mr.
Randazza's August 29, 2012 carefully worded and crafted email that he was
resigning his employment was deliberate.

J.   In addition to Mr. Randazza's disputed, disproved and unproved
allegations of sexual conduct engaged in or authorized by is important evidence
which established that Mr. Randazza was not either (1) a target of any
discriminatory or conduct which created a hostile work environment, because of
his being a heterosexual or "straight" male, or (2) offended by any of the sexually-
related conduct of which he has complained.

K.   Prior to and subsequent to agreeing to go "in house" as E/L's
general counsel, Mr. Randazza was outside counsel to several companies
engaged in Internet pornography, including videos and stills available on openly
homosexual websites. Since at least the date of the commencement of his
employment as E/L's inside general counsel through his last day of E/L
employment, Mr. Randazza knew of and was not in any way uncomfortable with
Mr. Gideon's gay sexual orientation--- which was also that of most, but not all,
of E/L's other executives --- and the frequent seasoning of business and socially-
related conversation and written communications with crude gay and other
sexual terms, references and allusions, which Mr. Randazza also used.

Mr. Randazza was not embarrassed to be seen or filmed in full undress at a poolside business-social event at Mr. Gideon's home. Mr. Randazza permitted and encouraged his children to have warm personal relationships with Mr. Gideon, who they called "Uncle."

L. The evidence was that the only complaints which Mr. Randazza had concerning the pornographic filming in his offices in April2012 --- four months before the end of his employment--- were that (1) he was not given the courtesy of advance notice of the shoot and (2) after the shoot was completed,
Mr. Randazza's office was not restored to just the way it had been before the office was prepped for filming.

The preponderance of disputed evidence was not that Mr.  Randazza complained to Mr. Gideon centering on or in any way reasonably relating to sexual discrimination or harassment or a hostile work environment based on sex, including "male-on-male" sex, which has been recognized as a basis
for a legal claim. Accordingly, allegedly involuntary termination of Mr. Randazza's employment, based on Mr. Randazza's April2012 complaint about the filming of pornography in his office --- which did not constitute statutorily "protected activity" ---is not includible as a component for a statutory claim that he had been fired in retaliation for making that complaint. Mr. Randazza's
complaint about the allegedly personally offensive oral copulation of Mr. Gideon in the back seat of his car on August 9, 2012 was not genuinely or deeply felt and was made primarily for tactical reasons. Therefore, the end of Mr. Randazza's employment was not and was not the product of anything retaliatory, in violation of public policy (e.g., engaging in protected activity), as a matter of law.

Moreover, the preponderance of the evidence is that Mr. Randazza had advance notice of the filming of a pornographic video in his office and that he did not either object or indicate that the noticed shoot was in any way objectionable or offensive to him. That evidence is the playful exchange of texts between Messrs. Randazza and Gideon concerning the intended shoot and the testimony of the director of the shoot, Chaz Vorrias, who testified that he advised Mr. Randazza of the shoot in advance and received no objection from Mr. Randazza.

M.   Contrary to the strong impression created by Mr. Randazza's pre-Arbitration Hearing narrative of allegations, there was no evidence that any photograph(s) of his wife or children or anything personal of or concerning Mr. Randazza or any member of his family, or in any way reasonably violative of
their respective personal privacy, were used or visible in the video. The (possible) visibility of a painting on the wall of Mr. Randazza's office, which was painted by Mr. Randazza's wife, is not to the contrary.

In the circumstances, there was no action taken which was either statutorily offensive or hostile.

N.  Mr. Randazza's California Labor Code-based claims--- for
Excelsior's failure to (1) pay him his final wages in August 2012 (2nd Claim) or
(2) reimburse and indemnify his for business expenses incurred by him in during
2012 (1st Claim)--- fail as a matter of law. The same is true for Mr. Randazza's
claim for payment of all of his wage-related claims --- including payment of
raises, bonuses and repayment of his $25,000 loan.

That is because--- at all times relevant to those California Labor Code claims, since June 2011, Mr. Randazza worked and lived in Nevada, to which Mr. Randazza relocated, as did E/L, in order to continue as E/L's general counsel. As stated or indicated in a pretrial ruling bearing on the same issue,

(1) the California Labor Code, presumptively, does not apply extraterritorially, and does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case, and relatedly,

(2) that determination, concerning Mr. Randazza's non-contractual claims, is unaffected by the California-as-governing- substantive-law provision of Mr. Randazza's employment agreement with
Excelsior, which applies and controls only as to breach-of-contract claims and
not, as in this instance, Mr. Randazza's statutory claims.

In the event, Mr. Randazza was properly compensated for all
services as to which he has asserted statutory and contractual claims.

Mr. Randazza's claim for unpaid wages and penalties under
Nevada NRS Sec.608.050 (3rd Claim) fails as a matter of law, because there is no
private right of action for enforcement of that statute. It is therefore not
necessary to decide whether the a claim has been stated under that statute.

P.   As to Mr. Randazza's contractual claims--- which are governed by
the Employment Agreement, including the provision that California law governs
its interpretation and enforcement, etc.---

(1) Mr. Randazza is not entitled to a contractual severance payment, because he voluntarily resigned his employment,

(2) Mr. Randazza is not entitled to any payment for expenses in connection with the annual International Trademark Association Conference, which he did not attend, and

(3) Mr. Randazza's bonuses were to be paid on "net" amount, not "gross" amounts, as contended by Mr. Randazza. In the event, E/ L has been legally excused from any obligation to make any further contractual payment, by reason of Mr. Randazza's material breaches of contract with respect
to the his obligations under the same contract, Mr. Randazza's employment agreement. That is so under contract law principles--- separate and apart from equitable principles, which are also applicable to contract claims, including the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, which is applicable to Mr. Randazza's contract claims.

Q. Turning to E/L's counterclaims, Mr. Randazza owed fiduciary
duties to E/ L, because he was their in-house general counsel and their attorney
of record in judicial civil actions, and an E/L executive and employee.

As such, Mr. Randazza owed E/ L, as his clients, employers and principals, the highest
duty of loyalty and honesty in the performance of his professional and executive
obligations. That duty--- among other things--- included legal and ethical
duties of acting honestly and solely for the benefit of his clients/ employers/ principals, avoiding acting inconsistently with those duties, and where actual or potential conflicts of interests existed to make full written disclosure of the same and to obtain informed written consents from his
clients/ principals as to each and every such conflict of interest.

Each and all of Mr. Randazza's ethical duties owed to his principals/ clients was a legal fiduciary
duty owed to them. Mr. Randazza violated those fiduciary duties owed by him to E/L, as his principals/ clients/ employers--- including by the following:


(1) engaging in negotiations for monetary bribes to be paid to him--- including
the "Oron $75,000" which Mr. Gideon noticed, without Mr. Randazza's
affirmative disclosure of it ---- which would result in his being "conflicted out" of
future litigation or any disputes with parties then and/ or in the future with
interests adverse to E/L's interests (e.g., Oron, TNA),J3 (2) taking control for his
personal benefit of, and refusing to relinquish control over, Oron settlement
funds --- all of which ought to have been for the benefit and under the direction
and control of his principals/ clients E/L, before and after the end of his
employment and representations on behalf of E/L ---

(3) Mr. Randazza's ordering and causing the deliberate "wiping" of his and legal assistant's
corporate laptops, as an integral part of his planned resignation as E/L's General
Counsel and outside counsel of record, and

(4) Mr. Randazza's continuing and undisclosed (and thus unconsented-to) legal work for clients (e.g., Bang Bros., XVideos, XNXX, Porn Garian, Titan Media, Kink), whose interests were actually
and potentially adverse to E/L's interests.

R. The Arbitrator respectfully disagrees with Mr. Randazza's expert
witnesses, who respectively testified that, under both Nevada and California
rules of ethics and/ or professional responsibility, there were no violations of
fiduciary duty, if and because they concluded that there was no resulting harm.

The "fact of damage" or proximate cause is not an essential element of either "duty" or "breach of duty" ---but rather a separate element of a claim or cause of The Arbitrator's disagreement with Mr. Randazza's expert witnesses centers Whether or not Mr. Randazza's breaches of fiduciary duty proximately resulted in damages sustained by Excelsior, Liberty or both of them ---as a matter of sound public policy--- Mr. Randazza should not be allowed to retain any pecuniary or legal benefit resulting from or closely connected to those
breaches.

For example, Mr. Randazza has included in his defense of his
admitted deletion of files and other legal information via multiple wipings of
company-owned computers the assertion that Respondents have not been able to
show any damage resulting from those multiple wipings. This is another of Mr.
Randazza's assertions in this arbitration of "No harm, no foul"--- which the
Arbitrator has not accepted, primarily because of the violations of duties
constituting and/ or including fiduciary duties. Ethical and other violations of
fiduciary duties do not require "fact of harm" to be shown by a preponderance of
the evidence or otherwise.

Moreover, in the circumstances of (1) multiple ethical violations
having been shown to have been committed by Mr. Randazza ---including
negotiating for and in the instance of the Oron settlement agreeing to a "bribe" to
be conflicted out of future litigation with adverse settling parties and other
conflicts of interest--- and (2) Mr. Randazza's ethical challenges shown in this
arbitration, there should be a presumption of "fact of harm" caused to E/L by Mr.
Randazza's conduct and, additionally, a presumption of Mr. Randazza's
intention to harm his clients by wiping everything off of his and his legal
assistant's company-owned computers.

As E/L's inside general counsel and employee, Mr. Randazza had
a legal and fiduciary duty--- no later than when his employment ceased,
regardless of whether or not with or without cause and/ or by whom ended---
to deliver every file and other piece of data and/ or information--- complete,
intact and undeleted, unmodified and immediately accessible and usable by E/L.

That included all files and data stored on the computers entrusted to Mr.
Randazza and his legal assistant Erika Dillon for their use by and on behalf of
E/L. Because of his noncompliance, indeed resistance to compliance with those
duties, they continued and continue to the day of the rendering of this award---
including beyond Mr. Randazza's belated and resisted turnover of one of the
laptop computers--- because another laptop entrusted to Mr. Randazza remains
unreturned. Those continuing fiduciary duties owed by him to E/L exist,
including by reason of his exclusive control over the computers and thus
superior knowledge of what was on each computer's hard drive before and after
he had everything on the returned laptops completely and multiply deleted ---
including prior and in contemplation of his planned resignation on August 29,
2012.


In the circumstances, Mr. Randazza 's generalized and unspecified
claims of privacy --- in attempted justification of his ordered complete and
multiple wipings of company-owned computers --- cannot be accorded weight or
credibility. By the same token, that ordered conduct raises an inference that
whatever was deleted was known and intended by Mr. Randazza to be harmful
to him and any claims and contentions which he might make in any dispute with
E/L --- i.e., deliberate spoliation, in addition to conversion.

Mr. Randazza cannot escape liability for spoliation or conversion ---
or, additionally, violation of his fiduciary duties as an employee, executive and
general counsel of E/L, by reason of the same conduct --- by claiming, as he has,
that Respondents have not shown any specific or tangible injury by reason of his
conduct in causing company-owned computers to be completely wiped of all
data prior to their resisted and belated return.

In the circumstances--- and paraphrasing former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ---neither Respondent should bear any burden or responsibility to come forward with any evidence of
damage, when they do not know what they do not know. As stated above--- with his actual exclusive knowledge of what was on the computers' hard drives, before and because he ordered them to be completely wiped and, in the instance of his returned laptop, multiply wiped before ultimate return--- Mr. Randazza committed spoliation of evidence, as well as improper conversion of his
employer's files, data and equipment and, in so doing, also violated his fiduciary
duties owed to E/L.

S. The closure of the Nevada State Bar's file on the grievance filed by
E/L has not been given any weight in this arbitration. The reasons for that are
manifold, several of the most significant of which include the following: (1) the
State Bar did not reach the merits of E/L's grievance, (2) even if it would have,
the standard of evaluation would have been 11 clear and convincing evidence,''
rather than the standard applicable in this arbitration of 11 preponderance of the
evidence, 11 (3) Mr. Randazza's response to E/L's grievance contained at least one
material misrepresentation acknowledged during an evidentiary session in this
arbitration (that he stopped representing XVideos in 2009), (4) the Nevada State
Bar closed its file with an express statement that it has "no authority to take any
action which could affect the outcome of any civil disputes or litigation, (5) many
of the issues and much of the evidence presented in this arbitration (identities of
represented entities, retainer and billing records, emails, etc.) was not available to
be presented by E/Lin support of its grievance (e.g., Mr. Randazza's assisting
Datatech, including via forwarding fruits of a disclosed (unnamed) computer
"hacker").

T.   E/L was damaged in at least the amount of $275,000, by reason of
the Oron resettlement, as a direct and proximate result of events being set in
motion by Mr. Randazza's violations of fiduciary duty and other duties, by his
having secretly negotiated a $75,000 bribe to conflict himself out from suing Oron
in the future.

U.    Mr. Randazza was unjustly enriched in the amount of $60,000. Of
that amount, $55,000 was paid to and received by Mr. Randazza's law firm,
rather than E/L, in connection with (1) Mr. Randazza's ostensibly pro bono
representation in connection with the so-called "Righthaven cases," of which E/L
was generally aware and consented to (A) with the understanding and on the
condition that Mr. Randazza was acting as a faithful, compensated E/L
employee, including in compliance with his employment agreement, with costs
of the representation advanced by E/L, including compensation as employees of
Mr. Randazza and his legal assistant Erika Dillon, and (2) unaware that
compensation was to be or actually paid to Mr. Randazza, via his law firm, until
after the fact, indeed after Mr. Randazza's resignation from E/L employment.

Mr. Randazza also received $5,000 from James Grady, in connection with E/L's
Oron litigation. Although Mr. Randazza testified, without corroboration, that
Of the $60,000 paid and received, (A) $55,000 was court-awarded attorneys' fees,
which were paid to Mr. Randazza's law firm, and (B) $5,000 was paid by James Grady.

Mr. Grady's payment was used for Oron litigation expenses, Mr. Randazza did
not disclose the receipt of the Grady $5,000 payment to E/L. In the
circumstances, and under principles of unjust enrichment, all compensation paid
to or for the benefit of Mr. Randazza should have been paid directly toE/Lor
turned over to E/L by Mr. Randazza ---neither of which was done, immediately
or ever.

V.    Mr. Randazza materially breached his employment agreement with
Excelsior by (1) acting as an attorney in connection with the TNAFlix litigation
and the Mega Upload case, his concurrent representation of XVideos and/ or
XNXX during his employment by Excelsior and (2) spending significantly
excessive time on non-Excelsior/Liberty matters beyond contractually-permitted
time under his employment agreement with Excelsior and by failing to wind
down his non-Excelsior/Liberty legal activities, as also provided in Mr.
Randazza's employment agreement.

The extent of Mr. Randazza's contractual material breaches made
them also breaches of fiduciary duty--- regardless of whether or not those
breaches of fiduciary duty were conflicts of interests, as some were.
W. Disgorgement of compensation paid by E/L to Mr. Randazza is an
available remedy, which is appropriate in the circumstances of Mr. Randazza's
clear and serious violations of fiduciary duty owed to E/L, and within the
Arbitrator's discretion, based on the evidence in this arbitration.


There is no requirement that causation or "fact of damage'' be shown. There is
no valid reason to distinguish between an executive who is "in house" general
counsel and other corporate executives with respect to the availability of the
remedy of forfeiture/ disgorgement of compensation for breaches of fiduciary
duty.

While it might be less easy to determine the appropriate amount of
disgorgement --- because, for example, the compensation paid is not a fixed
percentage, as in an ali-or-nothing legal or brokerage contingency fee
arrangement, contractual hourly arrangements, etc.--- that is not a disqualifying
factor or consideration. Considerations of proportionality and non-overlap with
an award under other remedies are applicable.

Disgorgement will be applied to E/L-paid compensation received
by Mr. Randazza in connection with litigation and other engagements on behalf
of non-E/L clients--- in material breach of contract, while employed byE/Land
beyond the significantly limited scope of his employment agreement (in terms of
subject matter and time) and/ or, in all events, in violation of his professional and
fiduciary duties owed to his principal/ client/ employer, E/L. See Par. l(V),
above.

None of the expert witnesses who testified concerning breaches of
legal ethics and fiduciary duties by attorneys and remedies for such breaches
opined that disgorgement is unavailable in all instances. The Arbitrator had the
sense, however, that Mr. Joseph Garin came close to opining that causation
and/ or "fact of damage" caused by an assumed breach of an ethical/ fiduciary
duty is or should be a prerequisite to the imposition of disgorgement, with which
opinion the Arbitrator respectfully disagrees (if that is Mr. Garin's opinion).2o In
so opining, Mr. Garin (as did Mr. Randazza's California expert witness, Ms. Ellen
Peck) testified that --- based on information provided by Mr. Randazza ---there
was not a single instance of an ethical violation, with which the Arbitrator also
respectfully agrees, based on all of the evidence adduced at hearing.

X.   While Mr. Randazza's obtaining Mr. Gideon's signature on the
promissory note for Mr. Randazza's $25,000 loan to E/L for Hong Kong legal
fees was rife with ethical infirmities, in the exercise of the Arbitrator's discretion,
the Arbitrator will not void the underlying loan. However--- again in the
exercise of the Arbitrator's discretion--- the Arbitrator will limit the benefit of
that decision to allowing Mr. Randazza to assert an offset, under this paragraph,
to any and all amounts awarded on E/L's counterclaims, up to a maximum
amount of $25,000 (i.e., no interest)--- which right of offset shall be conditional
upon Claimant's transfer to Respondent Liberty of all Oron settlement-related
and other E/L funds held in Claimant's attorney trust account, plus interest at
the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from August 29, 2012.
Y. E/L are the prevailing parties in this arbitration. As such one or
both of Respondents is or may be entitled to contractual attorneys fees under the
employment agreement.22

INTERIM ARBITRATION A WARD

Based upon careful consideration of the evidence, the applicable law, the
parties' written submissions, the Determinations hereinabove set forth, and good
cause appearing, the Interim Arbitration Award in this arbitration is as follows:

1. Claimant and Counter-Respondent Marc J. Randazza ("Claimant")
shall take nothing by any of his claims set forth in his Amended Arbitration
Demand.

2. Claimant shall pay Respondent(s) the following sums and
amounts, as and for monetary damages in connection with Respondents'
counterclaims. Said amounts are exclusive and non-duplicative of any amount
separately and additionally awarded to Respondents as part of the remedy of
disgorgement. See below.

Said amount includes the amount of $275,000, plus pre-award interest from August 13, 2012, at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per and for monetary damages in connection with the resettlement of the Oron litigation, as a direct and proximate result of Claimant's violations of fiduciary duty in connection with his negotiating for a $75,000"bribe" (to conflict him out of future representation against Oron) as part of the resolution of the Oron litigation.

Said amount will include the amount of $60,000, by which amount
Claimant was unjustly enriched--- in that Claimant (via his law firm), rather
than either Respondent received (A) $60,000 in connection with Claimant's
ostensibly pro bono representation in connection with the Righthaven cases,
while compensated for Claimant's time spent on the representation as employee,
in the course of his employment, as to which representation the costs were
advanced by Claimant's employer, and (B) received from James Grady in
connection with the Oron litigation.

Said amount will include the amount of $3,215.98 ---as and for
Respondents' expenses reasonably incurred in connection with QUIVX forensic
examination and attempted restoration of data on employer-owned laptop
computers and an iPhone used and returned, as applicable, by Claimant and
Erika Dillon. In addition, an amount yet to be determined, in the exercise of the
Arbitrator of Excelsior laptop computers entrusted to Claimant and Erika Dillon during their
employment by Respondents or either of them. The additional amount awarded
will be set forth in a further and/ or amended interim arbitration award and/ or
in the final arbitration award.

3. Claimant shall pay Respondent Excelsior the amount of $197,000.00
--- as and for disgorgement of an appropriate amount of Claimant's employment
compensation (including salary and bonuses) paid under his employment
agreement).

Disgorgement shall be based on Claimant's violations of fiduciary
duty ---including as acting as an attorney in connection with the TNAFlix
litigation and the Mega Upload case.

XVideos and/ or XNXX during his employment by Excelsior and spending
excessive, undisclosed, time on non-Excelsior/Liberty matters far beyond
contractually-permitted time under his employment agreement.


4. Claimant is hereby ordered forthwith (i.e., within ten (10) days of
the date of the issuance of this Interim Arbitration Award) to turn over to
concurrent representation of Respondents all Oron-related funds and, further, an additional $30,000 of non-Oron-related client funds of Respondents--- which funds have been held in
Claimant's attorney trust account--- plus pre-award interest at the legal rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum from August 29, 2012.

5. An accounting of Claimant's attorney trust account is hereby ordered--- including to ensure compliance with Paragraph 4 hereof. The accounting shall be performed by a qualified third-party accountant and/ or accounting firm appointed and/ or approved by the Arbitrator.

The cost and expense of which shall be borne solely by Claimant--- although Respondents
may advance the funds necessary for the accounting, subject to ordered reimbursement by Claimant. Claimant is hereby ordered to cooperate fully with the ordered accounting.

6. Claimant is hereby ordered to return the as-yet-unreturned
company-owned laptop to Respondents' counsel forthwith--- and in no event
later than ten (10) days from the date of the issuance of this Interim Arbitration
Award.

7. Respondent shall be awarded as damages or costs reasonably
incurred with this litigation, expenses reasonably incurred by QVIX or similarly
qualified expert vendor--- up to a maximum of $3,500 ---in connection with the
vendor's performance of successful and/ or attempted retrieval of data a report to
the Arbitrator of what, if anything was deleted from the computer and when.

8. Respondents and Counterclaimants Excelsior Media Corp. and
Liberty Media Holdings, LLC shall be afforded the right in this arbitration to
establish their rights--- if any, and according to proof--- to contractual attorney's
fees and costs.

Counsel for the parties are ordered to immediately commence and
diligently conduct and conclude meet-and-confer communications and to submit
to the Arbitrator within ten (10) days of the issuance of this Interim Arbitration
Award an emailed proposed briefing and hearing schedule for any application
for contractual attorney's fees and costs.

9. Respondent Jason Gideon will be dismissed as a party to this arbitration.

Subject to further order and/ or a further and/ or amended interim
arbitration award, and the Final Arbitration Award, this Interim Arbitration
Award, including the Determinations hereinabove set forth, is intended to be in
full settlement of all claims, issues, allegations and contentions, on the merits,
submitted by any party against any adverse party in this arbitration. Subject to
the immediately preceding sentence, claims and requests for relief not expressly
granted in this Interim Arbitration Award are hereby denied.


Dated: June 3, 2015

Arbitrator

Stephen E. Haberfield

Source
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bzn2NurXrSkiMV9xcl9qeVdpSUU/view

Crystal Cox has CLEAR and CONVINCING Counterclaims against her former attorney Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group.

a Bit ON Crystal Cox's Claims against Marc Randazz

DEFAMATION / SLANDER Claims

1.  Cox alleges that Marc Randazza defamed her.

2.  Cox alleges that Randazza KNEW that what he was posting online and swearing to WIPO, and telling NPR, Forbes, the New York Times and various legal bloggers and attorneys, was false. Therefore, Cox claims that Randazza had actual malice and that, as a matter of law Cox is entitled to all allowable relief, per law.

3.  Cox claims that she is entitled to stated relief and does not have to proof actual damages.

4.  Cox claims that Exhibit 21 shows that after Cox had fired Randazza and continued on solely with Eugene Volokh as her representation in her Ninth Circuit appeal, Randazza  emailed her and offered to be of any help to her in the future that she may need.

Yet when Cox emailed Randazza some time later asking for help, Randazza retaliated against Cox and told the world that the email was extortion.  Exhibit 21 proves that Randazza defamed Cox with intent, willfully, wanton, and maliciously. Even after claiming, offering to be of any kind of help to his former client Crystal Cox.

Exhibit 21,  On December 16th 2011 at 12:55 PM Randazza says he has no issue with Cox firing him and he offers to help Cox in the future in anyway he can.

Exhibit 21 shows that Marc Randazza claimed to respects Cox, he apologized if she felt not treated well and said the following:  "People like you are important for the future of citizen journalism, and I wish to see you succeed."

Yet Randazza painted Cox in false light to the entire world, and even in sworn statements claiming that she had extorted him and was guilty of the felony crime of extortion.

Marc Randazza did not file a criminal complaint, yet used his media and legal connections to paint me, Cox, as guilty for the crime of extortion. He violated my rights of due process, my constitutional rights, and he deliberately, with full knowledge of it being false, defamed me and made false statements to third parties around the world. Including NPR, Forbes, the New York Times, Legal and Fraud Experts, WIPO (international publications, domain names and intellectual property law), and he used his knowledge of First Amendment Law, and his connection to legal bloggers and big and small media to paint me out as a criminal worldwide.

Cox claimed that Randazza owed her a duty to keep her email asking him for help private and a duty to not do anything adverse to Cox. Cox claims that Randazza was negligent and unlawful when he then embarked on a 3 years and counting, campaign to maliciously harass, intimidate, sue, lie to courts and media and ruin her life, family, relationships, business, reputation and quality of life.

Cox claims she relied on what her former attorney said about her case, her best interest moving forward, and that he would follow through with what was her wishes for her case.

Cox claims she relied on her former attorneys word offering help to her even if in the background. Yet when she emailed him, taking him up on that offer. He took that private email and gave it to legal bloggers, courts, WIPO and  big and small media widespread, maliciously painting her in false light.

5. Cox claims that Exhibit 17, an email from Randazza to her proves that Randazza had full knowledge that what he was posting about Cox being an extortionist was false.

Exhibit 17 shows an email from Counter Defendant Marc Randazza to Counter Plaintiff Crystal Cox, in this email you see Randazza stating,  "Asking me for a job, or a recommendation? That doesn't bother me in the least."

However, after this Marc Randazza went on NPR, interviewed with Forbes and the New York Times, spoke with a large amount of attorneys who blog about legal cases, spoke with the New York times, made sworn statement in court and to WIPO, and posted on his own blog that Crystal Cox was guilty of extorting him.

The email that these sites and Randazza’s legal blog used, claiming it was extortion, was the very same email as seen in Exhibit 17 whereby it is clear that Marc Randazza himself believed that Cox was only asking for a job and not committing the felony crime of extortion.

Yet with full knowledge it was false, Marc Randazza painted Cox in false light to the entire world as extortionate and stated that Cox had extorted him. Even though Exhibit 17 clearly shows that he knew Cox was not attempting to harm or intimidate him or his family in any way. But that Cox was only asking for a job and that he did not mind her asking for a job.

Exhibit 17 shows that Marc Randazza is offended and perhaps even mad, however it clearly shows that Randazza believed that Cox was ONLY asking for a job. Yet he spent the next 3 years and counting, publishing and making false statements to all manner of media and swearing to those false statements to courts and WIPO, knowing full well that what he was saying was not factual.

Therefore, Cox alleges that Randazza instituted a world wide defamatory campaign against Cox to retaliate for her firing him in her infamous Landmark Ninth Circuit, First Amendment Case.

Cox alleges that this has ruined her life, affected what the Ninth Circuit Judges said, as they quoted the New York Times as proof of Cox’s alleged behavior.  Cox’s former attorney, Randazza painted the picture to the media, judges, attorneys, NPR and essentially the world that Crystal Cox was guilty of the felony crime of extortion.  Of which he had not filed a criminal complaint, had not filed an attorney general complaint and had no adjudicated fact that Cox had engaged in any sort of extortionate behavior at any time ever.

In fact Exhibit 17 shows clearly, without a doubt, that Randazza did not believe he was being extorted, but that in fact, he believed Cox was unreasonable and unethical for registering the domain name, but that she was just asking for a job.

This Exhibit proves that Randazza, with full knowledge of it being false, interviewed and flat out lied, made false and defamatory statements to NPR, Forbes, the New York Times, WIPO, the Czech Courts, Tracy Coenen and the Fraud Files, Kenneth White attorney blogger of Popehat.com and numerous other well connected bloggers, and Media around the world.   As well as made these false and defamatory statement in courts and on his own blog. KNOWING full well that it was false.

Cox alleges that this violates defamation, slander and libel laws and that she is due all allowable relief as a matter of law.

6. RANDAZZA gave blogger attorney Kenneth P. White of Popehat.com Cox's personal, priviliged, private email to her former attorney who told her to let him know if he could help her in any way, and he used this email to paint Cox in false light, deliberately not posting the whole email thread which showed that Randazza CLEARLY knew Cox was asking for a job, and not trying to extor him in ANY way..

Therefore because Cox would not simply turn over a domain name he thought she had no right to own, and had fired him in her landmark First Amendment case,he went on NPR, interviewed with the New York Times, Forbes, Popehat.com, and he viciously, deliberately, knowing it was false, lied, made false statements to WIPO who used their global clout to ruin the lives of Eliot Bernstein and Crystal Cox and accuse them worldwide and nationwide, in legal blogs, in big and small media, that Crystal Cox and Eliot Bernstein ( who never was even in the email) had extorted him, which is a felony crime.

This has led to discrimination and further retaliation against inventor Eliot Bernstein in his ongoing estate cases in Florida and his RICO case in the New York Courts.

7.  Exhibit 6, Exhibit 2, Exhibit 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, Exhibit 4,8,10, and 11, Exhibit 14,15,16,17a, Exhibit 14,15,16,17a show false and defamatory statements made by Randazza on his blog and to widespread legal bloggers, attorneys and other media.

Cox Claims she  is entitled to relief for the damage Randazza has caused her.

MALPRACTICE CLAIMS

1. Cox claims she relied on the legal advice of Marc Randazza.

Randazza, my former attorney obstructed my justice, violated my due process rights and my constitutional rights.  Marc Randazza was negligent in his legal representation of me, Crystal Cox and severely negligent in his duty of care, ethics and actions to harm me for years after my appeal, where he represented me.  This negligence cause me injury, defamed me, caused me irreparable harm, rendered my homeless, penniless and incited world wide hate against me.

Cox claims that as a matter of law and ethics, a lawyer shall use tactics that are legal, honest and respectful of courts and yet Randazza deliberately lied to the courts to paint her in false light, to ruin her life and business, and to sever her family and business connections.

Cox claims that Randazza used his clout, legal knowledge and credibility to abuse her, violate her due process rights, violate her constitutional rights and completely destroy her life, business, reputation and personal relations with deliberate intent and full knowledge of what he was portraying about Cox was not true. As the record clearly shows, Randazza himself did not even belief it, as Exhibit 17 clearly shows, he knew full well that Cox ONLY asking for a job, and that he told Cox he did not mind that.

A lawyer shall act with integrity and professionalism, maintaining his overarching responsibility to ensure civil conduct. Yet Randazza clearly did not do this.

A lawyer's duty to the court relates to his status as a professional who serves, not only clients, potential clients and former clients but also the public interest. Historically, a professional was distinguished from a tradesperson by a public declaration – demonstrated today by the oath taken at admission to the Bar – to serve others and devote their intellect and efforts to the public good.  Marc Randazza clearly failed in his duty to Cox, the court and the public.

Cox claims that with this Randazza has caused her irreparable harm and that she is due all allowable relief available to her as a matter of law.

A lawyer's duty to the court also relates to the profession's independence, or what

has been described as "the high degree of autonomy that lawyers experience from  external controls other than those imposed by self-regulation." Self-regulation is a privilege that comes with substantial obligations that are intended to protect the rights of individuals.

Randazza clearly has not maintained integrity as an officer of the court, but instead has used his power in the courts to retaliate against those whom he has a personal issue with or those who exercise their Free Speech rights and speak critical of him or his wife, as is our First Amendment Right.

Marc Randazza has used the power the courts have give him to issue false subpoena, scare and bully people into giving privileged, private information, and to file legal actions to use money, reputation and other tactics to force those he sues, litigants (targets) into taking whatever action he is trying to force them into, be it a settlement, removing gripe sites, taking down parody or graphics that poke fun at him, report on his cases representing the porn industry or really anything he disapproves of.  And this has caused Cox harm.

The duty to the court is also important because there are consequences for lawyers

who do not uphold it. This is demonstrated by the penalties attached to civil and criminal

contempt.  

A lawyer has a duty to use tactics that are legal, honest and respectful. This duty

is often referred to as the duty of candour. Under this umbrella of a lawyer's duty to the court, lawyers are primarily responsible for ensuring that they do not employ strategies that will mislead the court; this includes misleading the court on evidentiary and legal points as well as making use of tactical strategies that are likely to affect a case.

Cox claims that Randazza deliberately gave many courts, media, legal bloggers, NPR, Forbes, New York Times, WIPO and more, false information, false sworn statement of facts and he deliberately gave the courts false information regarding Cox, his former client and did so in his wife's case through his law firm, against porn industry whistleblower Alexandra Mayers, as well.  

Lawyers must respect the court. Respect comes in all forms – preparedness and timeliness are one aspect of consideration. Being familiar with the facts and law applicable to your case, and knowing your client's position is the most fundamental display of respect for the court process. This duty to the court is, in effect, an overlapping duty of competency we have to the client. A lawyer should not abuse the court process. A lawyer should not unreasonably raise or defend an action for which there is no legal justification.

Cox claims that Randazza sued her to bully her, intimidate her and suppress her speech. Cox claims that Randazza abused the court process with no real legal justification, and that this caused her irreparable harm.

Cox claims that Randazza knew her position in her appeal, yet went against her wishes and behind her back to strike a deal that would be good for the future and at that time current cases of his other clients, the large porn companies he represented. With this he completely violated her rights of dues process and duties owed to Cox as his former client, potential client, or current client.

Attorney Marc Randazza clearly disrespected the court process and, in his arrogance and disrespect of the court and the laws, completely violated Cox’s rights as a former client, a litigant and a U.S. citizen.

When dealing with others, a lawyer shall be courteous, civil and act in good faith with all persons with whom he deals with during the course of practice. Yet Marc Randazza incited world wide hate against me, filed Amicus Briefs, went on NPR, filed sworn statements, spoke to big and small media and maliciously, deliberately with willful and wanton intent incited hated, spread defamatory malicious lies, and did not act civil, not courteous and NOT in good faith.

A lawyer's duty of civility extends to those individuals who are integral to our legal process – such as witnesses.  Yet Marc Randazza threatened, bullied, sued, and maliciously attacked my church, those I worked for, ex's, those I minister to and did not act with civility at all.

Marc Randazza owed me a ''standard of care'' in which he clearly breached.

Legal Malpractice is a breach by an attorney in the standard of care or in the standard of conduct that is applicable to all attorneys.  Clearly Randazza breached his standard of care in regard to his former client Crystal Cox.

Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct Randazza Violated

CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

Randazza did not abide by my decisions concerning representation. He did not consult with me before proposing a deal allegedly on my behalf and in my best interest with the opposition, and he sought EXTREME retaliation when I chose to longer have him represent me as his client. This is a Violation of Rule 1.2.

Randazza did not abide by my wishes of wanting to appeal and pursued a settlement with the opposition of which he did not include me in the details of this negotiation.

Randazza acted in representations of Cox, without informed consent. And therefore violated Rule 1.2

Randazza did not discuss with me any actions that he thought I may have taken that he thought were criminal, of which, as my attorney he is obligated to. Instead he used his power over the courts and his clout with the media to defame me, and abuse me massive stress and irreparable harm.

If he thought I engaged in any criminal activity, it was his lawful and ethical duty to discuss this with me, instead of simply tell the world and the courts I was guilty of a crime with no adjudication or due process.

Rule 1.2.  Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer.

     (a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.

     (b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

     (c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.

     (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.

 Rule 1.5.  Fees.

Randazza violated rule 1.5 as he told me he was representing me for FREE, Pro Bono, then he turned around and wanted money to travel, to file documents, for hotels and more. Knowing full well that I had NO MONEY.

Rule 1.6.  Confidentiality of Information.

  Attorney Marc Randazza revealed ALL of my private information, strategy and secrets, not only to the opposition without informed consent but to the entire world. This has caused me irreparable harm of which I am entitled to financial relief.

I, Crystal Cox, Claim that Randazza violated Rule 1.5 in revealing my information without informed consent as the chronology above clearly shows.

Randazza also violated Rule 1.5 in putting me in physical harm, inciting hate among his peers and the world. And encouraging threats, harassment and online attacks of me. As well as physical threats of coming to my town, of taking out my knee caps, text threatening of knowing where I live and more.

Randazza published my home address to the world and used court motions to attack me, then gave those to media to defame me and expose my personal information and home address to the world.  All the while claiming I had harmed an infant child, lying about me and inciting world wide HATE.

Also under this rule, if he thought I had committed a crime then he went about handling it, completely unethical and in violation of my due process rights.

Randazza did not make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client. Therefore he violated Rule 1.5.

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraphs (b) and (d).

  (b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

         (1) To prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

         (2) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services, but the lawyer shall, where practicable, first make reasonable effort to persuade the client to take suitable action;

         (3) To prevent, mitigate, or rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer’s services have been or are being used, but the lawyer shall, where practicable, first make reasonable effort to persuade the client to take corrective action;

         (4) To secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules;

         (5) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or

         (6) To comply with other law or a court order.

         (7) To detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of employment or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the client.

  (c) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the representation of a client.

  (d) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.

Rule 1.7.  Conflict of Interest: Current Clients.

  If Randazza had a conflict of interest or felt that Cox was a criminal and did not want to represent her, me, then he should not have done so. Instead of getting her private information, strategy and secrets and then ruining her life, as details above, clearly show.

It is also a conflict of interest for Randazza Legal Group to represent Marc Randazza in suing his former client in the District of Nevada Randazza v. Cox case, as this law firm represented Cox and had a duty and obligation to her before representing another party to sue her, even if that party was one of their partners or own attorneys.

Randazza should not have sued me, nor represented himself doing so with the same law firm that represented me prior.

Rule 1.7 was clearly violated by Randazza

Rule 1.7

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

         (1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or

         (2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

  (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

         (1) The lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

         (2) The representation is not prohibited by law;

         (3) The representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

         (4) Each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing

Rule 1.8.  Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules.

Attorney Marc Randazza should not have engaged in any activity adverse to me, Crystal Cox, his former client and as seen above he engaged in many.

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:

         (1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;

         (2) The client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and

         (3) The client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.

  (b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.

 

  (d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.

  (e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:

         (1) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and

         (2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.

  (f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:

         (1) The client gives informed consent;

         (2) There is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and

         (3) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.

  (g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.

  (h) A lawyer shall not:

         (1) Make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement; or

         (2) Settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith.

  (i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

         (1) Acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and

         (2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

 

  (l) A lawyer shall not stand as security for costs or as surety on any appearance, appeal, or other bond or surety in any case in which the lawyer is counsel.

  (m) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing paragraphs, with the exception of paragraph (j), that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Attorney Marc Randazza stole my intellectual property, defamed me intentionally and maliciously, and caused me serious hardship.

Marc Randazza did not have a contract where he lined out any fees, yet he expected me to pay for things of which I had no real understanding and claimed to be representing me Pro Bono, for FREE.

Marc Randazza used private information, privileged information against me.

Marc Randazza had no right to portray me to the media as  he did.

Marc Randazza also violated the above rule in trying to negotiate deals, settlement and representation matters WITHOUT my consent or knowledge.  I CLEARLY did not give  Marc Randazza informed consent.

Marc Randazza violated Rule 1.8 in massive widespread conflicts of interest.

Rule 1.9.  Duties to Former Clients.

 

Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group represented me in pretty much the same issues exactly as RLG then represented  Marc Randazza in claims as a Plaintiff against me. This is a violation of this rule.

Marc Randazza and his law firm acted materially adverse to my interests. And did so with full knowledge and deliberate intent. This violates Rule 1.9

Marc Randazza used inside and privileged information he gained while representing me, against me to sue me. Which violates Rule 1.9.

Marc Randazza used information against me to my disadvantage. Which violates this rule.

Marc Randazza acquired protected information from me then used this to defame me, set me up for a crime, paint me out to the world as a criminal, sue me, take my blogs and intellectual property, interfere with my appeal, violated my due process laws, violated my constitutional rights, suppress my speech, harass, bully and defame me and my sources and to try and STOP my Ninth Circuit appeal against my will and my rights.  This violates Rule 1.6 and 1.9.

Marc Randazza revealed information about me, without my informed consent.

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

  (b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:

         (1) Whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and

         (2) About whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;

         (3) Unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

  (c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

         (1) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or

         (2) Reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

Rule 1.10.  Imputation of Conflicts of Interest.

 

Marc Randazza and his law firm RLG violated 1.10 in representing, Marc Randazza and his wife and child in suing me, Crystal Cox, their former client.

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.9, or 2.2, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.

  (b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm unless:

         (1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and

         (2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.

  (c) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

  (d) Reserved.

  (e) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in the firm shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless:

         (1) The personally disqualified lawyer did not have a substantial role in or primary responsibility for the matter that causes the disqualification under Rule 1.9;

         (2) The personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

         (3) Written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Rule 1.12.  Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral.

  Even if Marc Randazza did not believe he represented me, which he falsely claims, then he was at least acting as an arbitrator, mediator or other third party neutral in his counseling me, Crystal Cox, via phone and email, his email saying he would represent me, his negotiations with the opposition and his communications acting as my attorney with Eugene Volokh.

Which violates Rule 1.12.

(a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, or law clerk to such a person or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent confirmed in writing.

  (b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge or other adjudicative officer may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge or other adjudicative officer.

  (c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:

         (1) The disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

         (2) Written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.

  (d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multi-member arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.

Rule 1.18.  Duties to Prospective Client.

 

Marc Randazza claims in sworn statements that he was not my attorney. Yet he emailed me that he would take representation, he attempted to broker deals, he advised me on the phone and in emails about court transcripts, he told many attorneys he represented me, he discussed filing court motions with attorney Eugene Volokh, and counseled me on my case.

Therefore it is no excuse to have harmed me, defamed me, interfered with my business and personal relationships, only because he thought he was not acting as my attorney prior. Clearly he owed me the same standard of care as a potential client.  And Marc Randazza knew this full well as a seasoned attorney with his own law firm and in multiple states.

Marc Randazza violated Rule 1.18 and did not have my informed consent for his disclosure of my private emails, negotiation tactics, strategy, nor to provide information that caused me harm. And to do so deliberately with malicious intent.

Mr. Randazza claims, under oath, that he was not my attorney. I fully believe he was. However, if he were to convince this board that he was not my attorney, then clearly he was brokering deals allegedly on my behalf, clearly he was working with other attorneys (Eugene Volokh) and with the courts to file a motion for a new trial, as the email evidence shows, and in this was at least a third party neutral, a mediator, or I was a potential client. In that he owed me a duty to not harm me, not post my private emails to him, not paint me out to the world to be a criminal with no adjudicated facts, not offer to testify against me, not file amicus briefs in opposition to my best interest, not lie about me and defame me, protect  my rights and strategy in my case, and act with integrity as to my best interest.

If Randazza was not my attorney, then he was negotiating with the opposition, giving them my secrets, strategy, strengths and weakness without authorization from me.

Rule 1.18

(a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.

  (b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.

  (c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).

  (d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:

         (1) Both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing, or:

         (2) The lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and

               (i) The disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

               (ii) Written notice is promptly given to the prospective client.

  (e) A person who communicates information to a lawyer without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, or for purposes which do not include a good faith intention to retain the lawyer in the subject matter of the consultation, is not a “prospective client” within the meaning of this Rule.

  (f) A lawyer may condition conversations with a prospective client on the person’s informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer’s subsequent use of information received from the prospective client.

  (g) Whenever a prospective client shall request information regarding a lawyer or law firm for the purpose of making a decision regarding employment of the lawyer or law firm:

         (1) The lawyer or law firm shall promptly furnish (by mail if requested) the written information described in Rule 1.4(c).

         (2) The lawyer or law firm may furnish such additional factual information regarding the lawyer or law firm deemed valuable to assist the client.

         (3) If the information furnished to the client includes a fee contract, the top of each page of the contract shall be marked “SAMPLE” in red ink in a type size one size larger than the largest type used in the contract and the words “DO NOT SIGN” shall appear on the client signature line.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006; as amended; effective April 4, 2014.]

COUNSELOR

Rule 2.1.  Advisor. 

     Marc Randazza violated Rule 2. Even if Marc Randazza was NOT my attorney as he claims in court, then he was at the very east my counselor. Marc Randazza counseled me on my case, and yet turned around and deliberate caused me malicious, willful, wanton harm.

If not a counselor then at least an Advisor, Third Party Neutral or an Intermediary. And still owed me a duty of care, in which he clearly violated.

Rule 2.1.  Advisor.  In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

  Rule 2.1 (former Supreme Court Rule 167) is the same as ABA Model Rule 2.1.

     Rule 2.2.  Intermediary.

  (a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:

         (1) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client’s consent to the common representation;

         (2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms compatible with the clients’ best interests, that each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is unsuccessful; and

         (3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.

  (b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately informed decisions.

  (c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if any of the conditions stated in subsection 1 is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the intermediation.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Model Rule Comparison—2006

  Rule 2.2 (formerly Supreme Court Rule 168) is based on 1983 Model Rule 2.2. The ABA House of Delegates deleted Model Rule 2.2 and incorporated it into the comments to Model Rule 1.7 in 2002. The Rule has been retained in Nevada because Nevada has not adopted comments to the Rules and the Rule provides some guidance in clarifying conflict of interest concerns.

     Rule 2.3.  Evaluation for Use by Third Persons.

  (a) A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client.

  (b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client’s interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.

  (c) Except as disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Model Rule Comparison—2006

  Rule 2.3 (formerly Supreme Court Rule 169) is the same as ABA Model Rule 2.3.

     Rule 2.4.  Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neutral.

  (a) A lawyer serves as a third-party neutral when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.

  (b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer’s role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer’s role as one who represents a client.

ADVOCATE

     

Marc Randazza acted as my advocate. He spoke with other attorneys, my colleagues, and he told me that people like me are important. He was an advocate for me and turned around and acted with contention, revenge and retaliation.  Marc Randazza sued me in a frivolous, life altering oppressive lawsuit. He violated my First Amendment Rights, my rights of due process and acted in extreme against my best interest.

Marc Randazza put me in danger, rendered me homeless and with no way to rent a home nor to get clients and resume my life. as he painted me out as a scammer, and a felony criminal extortionist to the world. Therefore no one would hire me, rent to me and I lost all business and personal connections.

Marc Randazza violated Rule 3.1 in bringing claims against me. And in attempting to set me up for criminal claims.

Rule 3.1.  Meritorious Claims and Contentions.  A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

Marc Randazza violated rule 3.7 in offering to be deposed for the opposition in my appeal case.

Rule 3.7.  Lawyer as Witness.

  (a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless:

         (1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue;

         (2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or

         (3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client.

  (b) A lawyer may act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS OTHER THAN CLIENTS

Marc Randazza violated Rule 4.1 and LIED deliberately to others regarding me.  As the above chronology clearly shows Marc Randazza knowingly made false statements of fact to others, including and not limited to:  WIPO, Forbes, NPR, the New York Times, the Ninth Circuit court, Florida District Court, Nevada State and Federal Court, multiple legal bloggers and law firms, forensic investigators, my friend, my ex’s, my pastor, my church, my phone vendor, my domain registrar, and more Third Parties.

Marc Randazza did this with deliberate intention and deliberate knowledge that the false statements of fact were false.  

Rule 4.1.  Truthfulness in Statements to Others.  

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:

  (a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or

  (b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Marc Randazza maliciously made statement on his blog and to large and small media outlets, radio, WIPO and courts that were not “Truthful” and therefore violated my, Cox’s rights. Randazza made widespread false statements of material fact or law to a third person in regard to his former client, me, Crystal Cox.  I claim this has caused me harm and that I am entitled to relief.

Rule 4.4.  Respect for Rights of Third Persons.

 

Marc Randazza deliberately and with clear intention used every mean he could to embarrass, delay, and burden third parties to get private personal information about me. He did this in regard to and not limited to Diana Grandmason, Alexandra Mayers, Stephanie DeYoung, my church, my Pastor, my church secretary, and more. He pressured and threatened them until they gave information to him.

Rule 4.4

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.

  (b) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

Marc Randazza also violated Rule 4.4 in taking my private email to him and sending it to media, to legal bloggers and claiming it was extortion. Knowing full well that the full email thread showed him saying that he knew I was asking for a job.

LAW FIRMS AND ASSOCIATIONS

     Rule 5.1.  Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers.

  (a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

  (b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

  (c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer’s violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if:

         (1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or

         (2) The lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

     Rule 5.2.  Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer.

  (a) A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.

  (b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

Marc Randazza and Randazza Legal Group violated Rule 5.1 and 5.2.

INFORMATION ABOUT LEGAL SERVICES

   Marc Randazza violated Rule 7.1, 7.2 in misleading me that he was an advocate for the free speech of all. He made false statements of being a trademark and first amendment expert then used this law to attack me and as the District of Nevada case, docket entry 200 shows, Marc Randazza did not have a legitimate Trademark claim against me and violated my First Amendment Rights.

Marc Randazza violated my rights in violations of this rule as I was clearly mislead as to what he was an advocate for and what he was an expert in.  Turned out he was not an expert in Trademark, First amendment or domain law.

 Rule 7.1.  Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services.  A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or misleading if it:

  (a) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;

  (b) Is likely to create an unjustified or unreasonable expectation about results the lawyer can or has achieved, which shall be considered inherently misleading for the purposes of this Rule, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law;

  (c) Compares the lawyer’s services with other lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated; or

  (d) Contains a testimonial or endorsement which violates any portion of this Rule.

  [Added; effective May 1, 2006; as amended; effective September 1, 2007.]

Model Rule Comparison—2007

  Rule 7.1 (formerly Supreme Court Rule 195) is the same as ABA Model Rule 7.1 except that paragraphs (b) through (d) are Nevada specific and have no counterpart in the Model Rule. The 2007 amendments changed language in paragraphs (b) and (d) only.

     Rule 7.2.  Advertising.

  (a) Subject to the requirements of Rule 7.1, a lawyer may advertise services through the public media, such as a telephone directory, legal directory, newspaper or other periodical, billboards and other signs, radio, television and recorded messages the public may access by dialing a telephone number, or through written or electronic communication not involving solicitation as prohibited by Rule 7.3.

  These Rules shall not apply to any advertisement broadcast or disseminated in another jurisdiction in which the advertising lawyer is admitted if such advertisement complies with the rules governing lawyer advertising in that jurisdiction and the advertisement is not intended primarily for broadcast or dissemination within the State of Nevada.

  (b) If the advertisement uses any actors to portray a lawyer, members of the law firm, clients, or utilizes depictions of fictionalized events or scenes, the same must be disclosed. In the event actors are used, the disclosure must be sufficiently specific to identify which persons in the advertisement are actors, and the disclosure must appear for the duration in which the actor(s) appear in the advertisement.

  (c) All advertisements and written communications disseminated pursuant to these Rules shall identify the name of at least one lawyer responsible for their content.

  (d) Every advertisement and written communication that indicates one or more areas of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices shall conform to the requirements of Rule 7.4.

  (e) Every advertisement and written communication indicating that the charging of a fee is contingent on outcome or that the fee will be a percentage of the recovery shall contain the following disclaimer if the client may be liable for the opposing parties’ fees and costs: “You may have to pay the opposing parties’ attorney fees and costs in the event of a loss.”

  (f) A lawyer who advertises a specific fee or range of fees shall include the duration said fees are in effect and any other limiting conditions to the availability of the fees. For advertisements in the yellow pages of telephone directories or other media not published more frequently than annually, the advertised fee or range of fees shall be honored for no less than one year following publication.

  (g) A lawyer may make statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer’s services in advertisements and written communications. However, such statements are subject to proof of verification, to be provided at the request of the state bar or a client or prospective client.

  (h) Any statement or disclaimer required by these rules shall be made in each language used in the advertisement or writing with respect to which such required statement or disclaimer relates; provided, however, the mere statement that a particular language is spoken or understood shall not alone result in the need for a statement or disclaimer in that language.

  (i) Statement regarding past results.  If the advertisement contains any reference to past successes or results obtained, the communicating lawyer or member of the law firm must have served as lead counsel in the matter giving rise to the recovery, or was primarily responsible for the settlement or verdict. The advertisement shall also contain a disclaimer that past results do not guarantee, warrant, or predict future cases.

  If the past successes or results obtained include a monetary sum, the amount involved must have been actually received by the client, and the reference must be accompanied by adequate information regarding the nature of the case or matter and the damages or injuries sustained by the client, and if the gross amount received is stated, the attorney fees and litigation expenses withheld from the amount must be stated as well.

 

 

Randazza has Duties to Cox as a former client

   Marc Randazza and Randazza Legal Group owed me a duty, a standard of care, and had obligations to me as a former client. Marc Randazza and Randazza Legal Group violated Rule 1.9 and seriously acted adversely against me.

Rule 1.9.  Duties to Former Clients.

     (a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
     (b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:
            (1) Whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
            (2) About whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter;
            (3) Unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
     (c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
            (1) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the information has become generally known; or
            (2) Reveal information relating to the representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.
     [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Rule 1.7.  Conflict of Interest: Current Clients.

     (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
            (1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
            (2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
     (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
            (1) The lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
            (2) The representation is not prohibited by law;
            (3) The representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
            (4) Each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
     [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Marc Randazza and Randazza Legal Group violated Rule 1.7 in representing him and his family in suing me , a former client, and violated this rule with other aspects of this complaint.  It was directly adverse for Randazza Legal Group to represent Marc Randazza, Jennifer Randazza and their daughter in claims against me, their former client.  

Marc Randazza and Randazza Legal Group acted with serious conflicts of interest.

CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP

    Marc Randazza and Randazza Legal Group did not provide competent representation to me as the record shows. Marc Randazza violated Rule 1.1 and 1.2.

Rule 1.1.  Competence.  A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.
     [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]


     Rule 1.2.  Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer.
     (a) Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.
     (b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.
     (c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.
     (d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
     [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Marc Randazza violated Rule 1.3 and was negligent in his diligence in representing me, promptly informing me, communicating with me, respecting me and my wishes, being reasonable on consulting me regarding my objectives, and keeping me informed.

Rule 1.3.  Diligence.  A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
  
  Rule 1.3 (formerly Supreme Court Rule 153) is the same as ABA Model Rule 1.3.
     Rule 1.4.  Communication.
     (a) A lawyer shall:
            (1) Promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent is required by these Rules;
            (2) Reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished;
            (3) Keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
            (4) Promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
            (5) Consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
     (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Randazza had a duty to Cox to keep information Confidential

Marc Randazza violated Rule 1.6 in his disclosure of my secrets and strategy to the opposition in my case without my permission and with using private emails and information from me to him and him to me, as a weapon against me in courts and mass media to bully me, harass me, intimidate me and ruin my life and business.

Rule 1.6.  Confidentiality of Information.
     (a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by paragraphs (b) and (c).
     (b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
            (1) To prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
            (2) To prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services, but the lawyer shall, where practicable, first make reasonable effort to persuade the client to take suitable action;
            (3) To prevent, mitigate, or rectify the consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer’s services have been or are being used, but the lawyer shall, where practicable, first make reasonable effort to persuade the client to take corrective action;
            (4) To secure legal advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules;
            (5) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client; or
            (6) To comply with other law or a court order.
     (c) A lawyer shall reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.
     [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

     Rule 1.10.  Imputation of Conflicts of Interest.
    

Marc Randazza violated Rule 1.10 in knowingly representing a client in adverse to me, which in this case was his law firm representing him, his wife and his daughter as clients against me, their former client.

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.9, or 2.2, unless the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.
     (b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm unless:
            (1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and
            (2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.
     (c) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.
     (d) Reserved.
     (e) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in the firm shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer is disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless:
            (1) The personally disqualified lawyer did not have a substantial role in or primary responsibility for the matter that causes the disqualification under Rule 1.9;
            (2) The personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
            (3) Written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
     [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Even if Randazza were to oddly prevail at claiming he was not Coxs attorney, then he was at least a third party neutral.

Rule 1.12.  Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator or Other Third-Party Neutral.
     (a) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, or law clerk to such a person or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral, unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent confirmed in writing.
     (b) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer, or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral. A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge or other adjudicative officer may negotiate for employment with a party or lawyer involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally and substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge or other adjudicative officer.
     (c) If a lawyer is disqualified by paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in the matter unless:
            (1) The disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
            (2) Written notice is promptly given to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable them to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
     (d) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.
     [Added; effective May 1, 2006.]

Randazza ADVISED COX on his very first conference call and even in Exhibit 20 as per what to do with court transcripts.

Weaknesses in Crystal Cox’s Counterclaims against Marc Randazza

1. Counter Defendant Randazza claims he was not Cox’s attorney and therefore owes her no duties as her attorney, and therefore his online statements were simply accusations to a private citizen, or a public figure in which he had an opinion about.

Marc Randazza claims that he is somehow protected by the First Amendment and defamation laws to claim, state, publish that Cox extorted him, and brand Cox and Bernstein as Felony Extortionists. He claims that he was not Cox’s attorney and therefore owes no duty to Cox and is not, thereby guilty of defamation or malpractice.

2.  Cox claims that Counter Defendant Marc Randazza posted false information about her online, knowingly and with malice as he had inside information into Cox’s case and used this to cause her harm intentionally. Cox claims that Exhibits show that Randazza offered her help, claimed to respect her, and essentially set her up. As she asked him for a job and he claimed, as Exhibits show, that he had no problem with Cox asking for a job, yet painted Cox out to the world as guilty of the felony crime of extortion with the very email asking him for a job, that he claimed in the email, in his own words that he had no issue with.

3.  Counter Plaintiff Cox claims that Randazza was her attorney, she relied on information and advice he gave her. Cox claims that Randazza advocated for her, counseled her, negotiated on her behalf, co-counseled with Eugene Volokh in regard to her representation, and that he told other attorneys that he, indeed represented Crystal Cox in her Ninth Circuit appeal of Obsidian v. Cox.

4.  Cox alleges that Randazza advised on ordering transcripts from the court, advised her on what actions to take moving forward in her appeal, negotiated with the opposition (brokered a deal), and he requested inside information and case documents / files from Crystal Cox.

5.  Cox claims that Exhibits show that Randazza admitted that he would “bow out” and let Eugene Volokh handle the case. Cox claims there would be no reason to stand down if he did not represent her.  Cox claims that the only reason he had a right to discuss her case details with Eugene Volokh and the opposition was that he represented her, as her attorney.

6.  Cox claims that exhibits show that Marc Randazza agreed to representation, and from this Cox believed that Randazza represented her.

7.  Exhibit 1 shows that Eugene Volokh, attorney and UCLA Law Professor clearly thought Marc Randazza was Crystal Cox’s attorney. Volokh claimed that he had a long talk with Randazza and Randazza told him that he represented Cox. Cox also claims to have had a lengthy phone call with Volokh regarding his conversations with Marc Randazza on representation, case strategy, and moving forward.

8.  Exhibit 20 shows / proves that Marc Randazza was acting as my attorney, and in negotiations, talks and working with other attorneys on my behalf.

Exhibit 20 shows that Marc Randazza was advising Crystal Cox. Cox claims to have relied on this advice.  Exhibit 20 shows that Randazza was working with attorney Eugene Volokh on Cox’s behalf, and working with the courts, all on behalf of and in representation of Crystal Cox.

9.  Exhibit 9, Marc Randazza Answer to Interrogatories, where he admits to acting as my (Crystal Cox’s) attorney.

Cox alleges that Exhibit 9 further proves, by Randazza's signed admittance that he was trying to negotiate a settlement for Crystal Cox as her attorney and that he agreed to bow out as her attorney, in a conversation with attorney Eugene Volokh.

This exhibit 9 in full also shows that Randazza did not believe Cox extorted him, or was guilty of extortion or an extortionist nor did he have proof of this as a matter of law. Yet he deliberately, willfully and wantonly posted on his legal blog that Cox had extorted him. Randazza also told Forbes, NPR, Popehat.com's attorney blogger Kenneth P. White, WIPO and countless others that Cox had extorted him and got them to post the story on their high profile, credible blogs and reports to deliberately, maliciously defame Cox.

Cox claims that Exhibit 9 in full, all interrogatories, also shows that Randazza admits to Cox not having a blog about his child. Yet he told Forbes, NPR,and other big and small media that she did have a blog about his child and used it to extort him.

Cox claims that Randazza knew this was not true and deliberately, wantonly and willfully with full knowledge it was not the truth, painted Cox in false light and led the world to believe Cox had harmed, defamed, harassed and had a blog about his infant child. This alone has ruined Cox's life, interpersonal relationships, business and family connections. And has made it so Cox is unable to rent a home and has been homeless for a year now.

Interrogatory answer Number One discusses that Randazza knows that Cox cannot be considered an extortionist as a matter of law without first having a jury of her peers on this matter (page 4 line 12-14). Yet he knew Cox did not have a trial, nor even a complaint or investigation, as a matter of law in this regard, yet he deliberately and with malicious intent posted on his high profile legal blog that Cox is an Extortionist.

Counter Defendant Randazza claims Cox has a history of extortionate behavior. This is not true and is something he helped attorney David Aman portray to the media in regard to an excerpt of a settlement negotiation which according to rules of evidence was not admissible in court and certainly not legal to have been given to the media and spread like wildfire by Randazza with malicious intent to defame his former client Crystal Cox.

Cox has never committed extortion, never been under investigation for the crime of extortion and has never been convicted of extortion. Randazza, with full knowledge of the law, flat out claimed Cox was Guilty of Extortion on his legal blogs and he got his big media connections, small media, bloggers and attorney legal bloggers to say those same things in retaliation against Cox.

There are no open investigation of Cox for extortion, and there have never been a criminal complaint, investigation or conviction of extortion against Cox.

There is no evidence, what so ever that I, Crystal Cox, have ever posted anything online to seek a payoff of any kind.  I have never sought a financial advantage. I, Crystal Cox, have approx. 1500 blogs in which I report on corruption as I see it and give victims of that corruption a voice in online media.

Randazza Admits to Being Cox's Attorneys in his Sworn Signed Interrogatory Answer ( See Full Exhibit Nine)

INTERROGATORY NO. 21 Shows that Randazza Admits to having spoke with attorney, UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh and offering to "bow out" if Volokh were to take the case. The question becomes why would Randazza believe he would have to bow out, if he claims he was never Cox's attorney in the first place.

This is evidence to further prove Randazza represented Crystal Cox and told others that he represented Cox. Thereby violating Cox's right to confidentiality and laws to protect clients. Proving Cox has a valid malpractice claim.

This interrogatory answer, of which Randazza signed and swore too as true and correct, also shows Randazza admitting to negotiating a settlement on behalf of Cox, acting as her attorney.

The question then becomes what legal right did Randazza have to choose for me, make decision for me and to bow out as my attorney if he was not my attorney as he has claimed under sworn statement to this court in previous documents and motions?

This proves that Randazza was discussing a settlement with the opposition and therefore giving away my secrets, strategy, my strengths and weaknesses and meddling in my case without telling me what he was say, what settlement he was offering nor having a signed agreement with me.

Randazza clearly established an attorney client relationship with Cox and then used privileged information about Cox to defam her, ruin her life, discredit her and paint her in false light.

Randazza admits to discussing strategy with Volokh and did so without my permission or knowledge. He admits to acting as my attorney.

INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

Did you have phone conversations with Eugene Volokh and state that you represented Cox and discuss with him your strategy, or a deal you were trying to make with the opposition, Plaintiff’s attorney David Aman?

RESPONSE TO INTERROGATORY NO. 21:

"Counterdefendant objects to Interrogatory No. 21 on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad, not limited in time and scope, and seeks information which is neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Counterdefendant further objects because this interrogatory is in excess of the 25 allowable interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As a result, Counterdefendant is not required to respond to the same. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, Counterdefendant responds as follows:

Counterdefendant spoke with Eugene Volokh in December 2011.

Randazza informed Volokh that if he was going to represent Cox, that Randazza would gladly bow out, and defer to Volokh to handle the case.

Volokh, however, said that he would prefer that Randazza co-counsel the case with him due to Volokh’s stated lack of litigation experience. Counterdefendant and Volokh discussed possible strategies that he and Volokh thought might be good ideas during that call.

Counterdefendant and Volokh both discussed the fact that Cox’s interests would be better served through settlement."

(Exhibit 9)

As seen above, Interrogatory 21, Randazza admitted to offering to co-counsel and that he spoke with attorney Eugene Volokh acting as Cox’s attorney and as if he had the full legal authority to do so. Randazza offered to bow out. Why would he bow out if he did not believe or was not acting as Cox’s attorney?

In the answer for Interrogatory 22, Randazza admits to discussing strategy with me, asking for files from me, discussing settlement options, Cox's goals for the litigation, and this clearly creates an attorney client relationship, especially seeings how Randazza acted on this information and contacted the Opposition and disclosed this information.

In 23 Randazza claims that I, Cox, gave him permission to discuss a settlement with Obsidian. Clearly in him presenting settlement offers to the opposition, he was acting as an attorney, in what he thought or represented himself as representing me. Why else would the opposition listen to him? He claimed to be my attorney.

Exhibit 17 also and again shows Marc Randazza knew he was my “actual attorney” or at the very least, my “potential attorney”.

Exhibit 19 shows that Marc Randazza agreed to and knew he was Crystal Cox’s attorney.

Exhibit 20, shows that attorney Eugene Volokh, clearly believed that Marc Randazza represented Crystal Cox, and had been told such by Randazza himself.

Exhibit 21 clearly shows Marc Randazza saying that he was trying to broker a deal on Cox’s behalf.  Exhibit 21 shows that Randazza wished that Cox, I succeed and claims to have respect for me, and people like me and says that I am important. Exhibit 21  shows that Randazza apologizes if I felt disrespected.

Exhibit 21 shows that Randazza had asked me for money, and did so with no presented and signed agreement as per Nevada policy for attorneys. Randazza claimed he was representing me for free then demanded money for his expenses.

And Exhibit 21 shows that Randazza offered to help Cox in any way she may need. Cox assumed this to be any legal questions she may have, anything to help her case or to help her personally such as asking for a job. Cox assumed Randazza would keep her confidences as they moved forward with him being fired and Eugene Volokh moving forward alone as Cox’s attorney.